Autocrypt Level 1 Specification

Release 1.0.1

Autocrypt team, licensed CC0

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Autocrypt aims to incrementally and carefully replace cleartext e-mail with end-to-end encrypted e-mail. This differs from the traditional approach of maximizing the security of individual mail communications. **Sometimes Autocrypt recommends to send cleartext mail even though encryption appears technically possible.** This is because we want to avoid unreadable mail for users. Users may mix both Autocrypt-capable and traditional mail apps and they may lose devices or in other ways the ability to decrypt in unrecoverable ways. Reverting to cleartext when we suspect such situations is a key part of our aim to stay out of the way of users.

Another major difference in approach is that Autocrypt Level 1 only defends against passive data collection attacks. We share and support **the new perspective stated in RFC7435 ("Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time")**[1]. Protection against active adversaries (those which modify messages in transit) is the aim of future specifications.

Level 1 makes it easy for users to encrypt, based on an automatic and decentralized key distribution mechanism. There are no dependencies on key servers and it is meant to work with existing e-mail providers. Level 1 focuses on the use of Autocrypt on a single device. Users get rudimentary support on using Autocrypt on more than one device or mail app. This is internally realized through sending and receiving an Autocrypt Setup Message, secured by manually entering a long number. Improving usability for maintaining synchronized Autocrypt state on multiple devices is the aim of future specification efforts.

Last but not least, Level 1 is meant to be relatively easy for developers to adopt. It describes the basic capabilities required for a mail app to be Autocrypt-capable at Level 1, allowing it to exchange end-to-end encrypted e-mails with other Autocrypt-capable mail apps. The spec contains detailed guidance on protocol, internal state and user interface concerns. We have a good track record of supporting new implementers. Please don't hesitate to contact the group[2] or bring up issues or pull requests. Autocrypt is a living specification and we envision both bugfix and backward-compatible feature releases.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7435.html#section-1.2
[2] https://autocrypt.org/en/latest/contact.html

Contents

1 Terminology

1.1 Keywords to indicate requirement levels

The keywords “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in the IETF’s Best Current Practice 14 (as defined in **RFC 2119**[3] and **RFC 8174**[4]) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2 Overview

2.1 Approach and High Level Overview

Autocrypt’s primary goal is to automate both secret and public key management so that users can encrypt mail without specialized knowledge.

This specification adds an *Autocrypt-specific mail header* (page 5) to outgoing mails, which contains, among other information, the sender’s public key. Transferring public keys in-band means that key discovery in Autocrypt does not require external infrastructure like OpenPGP keyservers or x509 PKI.

Autocrypt provides a *set of rules* (page 7) that tracks this information for each communication peer. Autocrypt uses this information to determine whether encryption is possible and makes a *recommendation* (page 7) about whether encryption should be enabled for a given set of recipients.

This specification also introduces the *Autocrypt Setup Message* (page 12) as a way to transfer secret key material and related settings to other e-mail programs controlled by the same user. This spec also provides guidance on how and when to *generate* (page 13), *look for* (page 15), and *import* (page 14) these messages.

Autocrypt aggressively distributes public keys, but conservatively recommends encryption to avoid disruption to established e-mail workflows. Specifically, Autocrypt only recommends that an e-mail be encrypted if encryption is possible, and:

1. The sender specifically requests encryption during message composition;
2. The e-mail is in reply to an encrypted message; or,
3. The sender and the recipients have explicitly stated that they *prefer* (page 5) encrypted e-mail.

2.2 Requirements on MUA/E-mail Provider interactions

Autocrypt tries to impose minimal requirements on MUA and e-mail service interactions. Specifically, an Autocrypt-capable MUA needs to be able to:

- Control the contents of outgoing e-mail including the ability to set custom e-mail headers;
- Send e-mail on its own (required by the *Autocrypt Setup Message* (page 12));
- Read whole, raw e-mails including message headers; and,
- Optionally, scan the user’s mailbox for mail with specific headers.

If a particular e-mail account does not expose one of the required features (e.g., if it only exposes a javascript-driven web interface for message composition that does not allow setting e-mail headers), then the e-mail account cannot be used with Autocrypt. An Autocrypt-capable MUA may still access and control the account, but it will not be able to enable Autocrypt on it.

[3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119.html
[4] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8174.html

2.3 Autocrypt Internal State

An Autocrypt MUA needs to associate information with the peers it communicates with and the accounts it controls.

2.3.1 Communication Peers

Each communication peer is identified by an e-mail address. Autocrypt associates state with each peer. Conceptually, we represent this state as a table named `peers`, which is indexed by the peer's *canonicalized e-mail address* (page 16), .

For the peer with the address `addr`, an MUA MUST associate the following attributes with `peers[addr]`:

- `last_seen`: The UTC timestamp of the most recent effective date (*definition* (page 7)) of all messages that the MUA has processed from this peer.
- `autocrypt_timestamp`: The UTC timestamp of the most recent effective date (the "youngest") of all messages containing a valid `Autocrypt` header that the MUA has processed from this peer.
- `public_key`: The value of the `keydata` attribute derived from the youngest `Autocrypt` header that has ever been seen from the peer.
- `prefer_encrypt`: The `prefer-encrypt` value (either `nopreference` or `mutual`) derived from the youngest `Autocrypt` header ever seen from the peer.

Autocrypt-capable MUAs that implement *Gossip* (page 10) should also associate the following additional attributes with `peers[addr]`:

- `gossip_timestamp`: the UTC timestamp of the most recent effective date of all messages containing a valid `Autocrypt-Gossip` header about the peer.
- `gossip_key`: the value of the `keydata` attribute derived from the most recent message containing a valid `Autocrypt-Gossip` header about the peer.

How this information is managed and used is discussed in *Peer State Management* (page 5).

2.3.2 Accounts controlled by the MUA

A Level 1 MUA maintains an internal structure `accounts` indexed by the account's *canonicalized e-mail address* (page 16) (`addr`). For each account controlled by the MUA, `accounts[addr]` has the following attributes:

- `enabled`: a boolean value, indicating whether Autocrypt is enabled for this account.
- `secret_key`: The RSA secret key material used for the account (see *Secret key generation and storage* (page 11)).
- `public_key`: The OpenPGP transferable public key (**OpenPGP "Transferable Public Key"**[5]) derived from the secret key.
- `prefer_encrypt`: The user's encryption preference for this account. This is either `mutual` or `nopreference`. This SHOULD default to `nopreference`.

If `accounts[addr].enabled` is `true`, the MUA SHOULD allow the user to switch the setting for `accounts[addr].prefer_encrypt`. This choice might be hidden in something like a "preferences pane". See *Account Preferences* (page 15) for a specific example of how this could look.

How this information is managed and used is discussed in *Managing accounts controlled by the MUA* (page 11).

[5] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.1

3 Peer State Management

An Autocrypt MUA updates the state it holds for each communication peer using the e-mails received from that peer. Specifically, Autocrypt updates the state using the `Autocrypt` e-mail header.

3.1 The `Autocrypt` Header

The `Autocrypt` header has the following format:

```
Autocrypt: addr=a@b.example.org; [prefer-encrypt=mutual;] keydata=BASE64
```

There are three defined attributes:

- The `addr` attribute is mandatory, and contains the single recipient address this header is valid for. If this address differs from the one in the `From` header, the entire `Autocrypt` header MUST be treated as invalid.

  The Internet Message Format[6] documents three types of originator fields: `From`, `Sender`, and `Reply-To`. Autocrypt is concerned only with the `From` field, and ignores the other originator fields.

- The `prefer-encrypt` attribute is optional and can only occur with the value `mutual`. Its presence in the `Autocrypt` header indicates an agreement to enable encryption by default with other peers who have the same preference. An Autocrypt Level 1 MUA that sees the attribute with any other value (or that does not see the attribute at all) should interpret the value as `nopreference`.

- The `keydata` attribute is mandatory, and contains the key data for the specified `addr` recipient address. The value of the `keydata` attribute is a Base64 representation of the binary **OpenPGP "Transferable Public Key"**[7]. For ease of parsing, the `keydata` attribute MUST be the last attribute in this header.

Additional attributes are possible before the `keydata` attribute. If an attribute name starts with an underscore (_), it is a "non-critical" attribute. An attribute name without a leading underscore is a "critical" attribute. The MUA SHOULD ignore any unsupported non-critical attributes and continue parsing the rest of the header as though the attribute does not exist. It MUST treat the entire `Autocrypt` header as invalid if it encounters a "critical" attribute that it doesn't support.

To introduce incompatible changes, future versions of Autocrypt may send multiple Autocrypt headers, and hide the incompatible headers from Level 1 MUAs by using critical attributes. According to the above rules, such headers will be judged invalid, and discarded by level 1 MUAs. Such an update to the specification will also have to describe how an updated MUA will deal with multiple valid headers.

3.1.1 OpenPGP Based key data

The `keydata` sent by an Autocrypt-enabled Level 1 MUA MUST consist of an **OpenPGP "Transferable Public Key"**[8] containing exactly these five OpenPGP packets:

- a signing-capable primary key
- a user id
- a self signature over the user id by the primary key
- an encryption-capable subkey
- a binding signature over the subkey by the primary key

The content of the user id packet is only decorative. By convention, it contains the same address used in the `addr` attribute placed in angle brackets. (This makes it conform to the **RFC 5322**[9] grammar `angle-addr`.) For compatibility concerns, the user id SHOULD NOT be an empty string.

These packets MUST be assembled in binary format (not ASCII-armored), and then base64-encoded.

[6] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5322.html#section-3.6.2
[7] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.1
[8] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.1
[9] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5322.html

A Level 1 MUA MUST be capable of processing and handling 2048-bit and 3072-bit RSA public keys. It MAY support other OpenPGP key formats found in an Autocrypt header (for example, by passing it agnostically to an OpenPGP backend for handling).

3.1.2 Header injection in outbound mail

During message composition, if the `From:` header of the outgoing e-mail (the `from-addr`) matches an address for which `accounts[from-addr].enabled` is `true` and the Autocrypt-capable MUA has secret key material (`accounts[from-addr].secret_key`), the MUA SHOULD include an Autocrypt header.

This header MUST contain the corresponding public key material (`accounts[from-addr].public_key`) as the `keydata` attribute, and `from-addr` as the `addr` attribute. The most minimal Level 1 compliant MUA will only include these two attributes. If `accounts[from-addr].prefer_encrypt` is set to `mutual`, then the header MUST have a `prefer-encrypt` attribute with the value `mutual`.

The MUA MUST NOT include more than one valid Level 1 `Autocrypt` header (see *Updating Autocrypt Peer State* (page 7)).

If the `From` address changes during message composition (e.g., if the user selects a different outbound identity), then the MUA MUST change the `Autocrypt` header accordingly.

An MUA SHOULD send out the same `Autocrypt:` header in all messages from a given outbound identity. An MUA SHOULD NOT vary the header based on the message's recipients. If (for whatever reason) the MUA needs to update (or discovers an update of) the user's `keydata` at some point, the MUA SHOULD send the updated `keydata` in all subsequent `Autocrypt` headers.

See *Example Autocrypt headers* (page 17) for examples of outbound headers and the following sections for header format definitions and parsing.

3.2 Internal state storage

See *Communication Peers* (page 4) for the information stored for each communication peer.

Autocrypt MUAs keep state about each peer, to handle several nuanced situations that have caused trouble or annoyance in the past. This state is updated even when the peer sends mail without an `Autocrypt` header.

For example, if a remote peer disables Autocrypt or drops back to only using a non-Autocrypt MUA, we must stop sending encrypted mails to this peer automatically.

In addition to the per-peer state described in *Communication Peers* (page 4), MUAs MAY also store other information gathered for heuristic purposes, or for other cryptographic schemes (see the Autocrypt website[10] for some example ideas).

However, in order to support future synchronization of Autocrypt state between MUAs, it is critical that Autocrypt-capable MUAs maintain the state specified here, regardless of what additional state they track.

Note:

- An implementation MAY also choose to use keys from other sources (e.g., a local keyring) at its own discretion.
- If an implementation chooses to automatically ingest a key from an `application/pgp-keys` attachment as though it was found in an `Autocrypt` header, it should only do so if the attached key has a **User ID**[11] that matches the message's `From` address.

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[10] https://autocrypt.org/en/latest/optional-state.html
[11] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-5.11

3.3 Updating Autocrypt Peer State

Incoming messages may be processed to update the `peers` entry for the sender identified by `from-addr` as extracted from the `From` header, by an MUA at receive or display time.

Messages SHOULD be ignored (i.e., `peers[from-addr]` SHOULD NOT be updated) in the following cases:

- The content-type is `multipart/report`. In this case, it can be assumed the message was auto-generated. This avoids triggering a `reset` state from received Message Disposition Notifications (**RFC 3798**[12]).
- There is more than one address in the `From` header.
- The MUA believes the message to be spam. If the user marks the message as not being spam the message MAY then be processed for `Autocrypt` headers.

When parsing an incoming message, an MUA SHOULD examine all `Autocrypt` headers, rather than just the first one. If there is more than one valid header, this SHOULD be treated as an error, and all `Autocrypt` headers discarded as invalid.

Updating `peers[from-addr]` depends on:

- the `effective date` of the message, which we define as the sending time of the message as indicated by its `Date` header, or the time of receipt if that date is in the future or unavailable.

  Note: A message without a `Date` header, or with a `Date` that seems to be in the far future can cause problems for MUAs that encounter the message repeatedly (e.g. re-delivery, subsequent scans, etc). An MUA MAY decide to ignore such a message entirely for the purposes of Autocrypt processing. If an MUA is capable of associating information with a received message, it could instead save the `effective date` of such a message the first time it sees it to avoid accidental re-processing.

- the `keydata` and `prefer-encrypt` attributes of the single valid `Autocrypt` header (see above), if available.

The update process proceeds as follows:

1. If the message's effective date is older than the `peers[from-addr].autocrypt_timestamp` value, then no changes are required, and the update process terminates.
2. If the message's effective date is more recent than `peers[from-addr].last_seen` then set `peers[from-addr].last_seen` to the message's effective date.
3. If the `Autocrypt` header is unavailable, no further changes are required and the update process terminates.
4. Set `peers[from-addr].autocrypt_timestamp` to the message's effective date.
5. Set `peers[from-addr].public_key` to the corresponding `keydata` value of the `Autocrypt` header.
6. Set `peers[from-addr].prefer_encrypt` to the corresponding `prefer-encrypt` value of the `Autocrypt` header.

3.4 Provide a recommendation for message encryption

On message composition, an Autocrypt-capable MUA can decide whether to try to encrypt the new e-mail message. Autocrypt provides a recommendation for the MUA.

All Autocrypt-capable MUAs should be able to calculate the same Autocrypt recommendation.

This recommendation algorithm provides sensible guidance that avoids many common problems, and Autocrypt-capable MUAs SHOULD follow the recommendation. An implementation that deviates from the recommendation should do so on the basis of specific external evidence or knowledge, while carefully considering the impact of any variation, including:

[12] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3798.html

- does it increase the chance of producing unexpectedly unreadable mail (for either the sender or the recipient)?
- does it leak previously encrypted content in the clear?
- does it force the user to confront a choice they do not have the information or knowledge to make safely?

If an implementation deviates from the Autocrypt recommendation in a meaningful and useful way, the implementer should describe the variation publicly so it can be considered for future revisions of this specification.

3.4.1 Recommendation structure

The Autocrypt recommendation depends on the recipient addresses of the draft message, and on whether or not the message is a reply to an encrypted message. When the user changes the recipients during composition, the Autocrypt recommendation may change.

The output of the Autocrypt recommendation algorithm has two elements:

- `ui-recommendation`: a single state recommending the state of the encryption user interface, described below.
- `target-keys`: a map of recipient addresses to public keys.

`ui-recommendation` can take four possible values:

- `disable`: Disable or hide any UI that would allow the user to choose to encrypt the message. This happens iff encryption is not immediately possible.
- `discourage`: Enable UI that would allow the user to choose to encrypt the message, but do not default to encryption. If the user manually enables encryption, the MUA SHOULD warn that the recipient may not be able to read the message. This warning message MAY be supplemented using optional counters and user-agent state[13].
- `available`: Enable UI that would allow the user to choose to encrypt the message, but do not default to encryption.
- `encrypt`: Enable UI that would allow the user to choose to send the message in cleartext, and default to encryption.

3.4.2 Recommendations for single-recipient messages

The Autocrypt recommendation for a message composed to a single recipient with the e-mail address `to-addr` depends primarily on the value stored in *peers[to-addr]* (page 4).

Determine if encryption is possible

If there is no `peers[to-addr]`, then set `ui-recommendation` to `disable`, and terminate.

For the purposes of the rest of this recommendation, if either `public_key` or `gossip_key` is revoked, expired, or otherwise known to be unusable for encryption, then treat that key as though it were `null` (not present).

If both `public_key` and `gossip_key` are `null`, then set `ui-recommendation` to `disable` and terminate.

Otherwise, we derive the recommendation using a two-phase algorithm. The first phase computes the `preliminary-recommendation`.

[13] https://autocrypt.org/en/latest/optional-state.html

Preliminary Recommendation

If `public_key` is `null`, then set `target-keys[to-addr]` to `gossip_key` and set `preliminary-recommendation` to `discourage` and skip to the *Deciding to Encrypt by Default* (page 9).

Otherwise, set `target-keys[to-addr]` to `public_key`.

If `autocrypt_timestamp` is more than 35 days older than `last_seen`, set `preliminary-recommendation` to `discourage`.

Otherwise, set `preliminary-recommendation` to `available`.

Deciding to Encrypt by Default

The final phase turns on encryption by setting `ui-recommendation` to `encrypt` in two scenarios:

- If `preliminary-recommendation` is either `available` or `discourage`, and the message is composed as a reply to an encrypted message, or
- If the `preliminary-recommendation` is `available` and both `peers[to-addr].prefer_encrypt` and `accounts[from-addr].prefer_encrypt` are `mutual`.

Otherwise, the `ui-recommendation` is set to `preliminary-recommendation`.

3.4.3 Recommendations for messages to multiple addresses

For level 1 MUAs, the Autocrypt recommendation for a message composed to multiple recipients, we derive the message's recommendation from the recommendations for each recipient individually.

The aggregate `target-keys` for the message is the merge of all recipient `target-keys`.

The aggregate `ui-recommendation` for the message is derived in the following way (the earliest matching rule encountered below takes precedence over later rules):

1. If any recipient has a `ui-recommendation` of `disable`, then the message's `ui-recommendation` is `disable`.
2. If every recipient has a `ui-recommendation` of `encrypt`, then the message `ui-recommendation` is `encrypt`.
3. If any recipient has a `ui-recommendation` of `discourage`, then the message `ui-recommendation` is `discourage`.

Otherwise, the message `ui-recommendation` is `available`.

While composing a message, a situation might occur where the `ui-recommendation` is `available`, the user has explicitly enabled encryption, and then modifies the list of recipients in a way that changes the `ui-recommendation` to `disable`. When this happens, the MUA should not disable encryption without communicating this to the user. A graceful way to handle this situation is to save the enabled state, and only prompt the user about the issue when they send the mail.

3.5 Message Encryption

Note: An e-mail that is said to be "encrypted" here will be both signed and encrypted in the cryptographic sense.

An outgoing e-mail message will be sent encrypted in either of two cases:

- the Autocrypt recommendation for the list of recipients is `encrypt`, and not explicitly overridden by the user, or

- the Autocrypt recommendation is `available` or `discourage`, and the user chose to encrypt.

When encrypting, the MUA MUST construct the encrypted message as a **PGP/MIME**[14] message that is signed by the user's Autocrypt key, and encrypted to the currently known Autocrypt key of each recipient, as well as the sender's Autocrypt key.

3.5.1 E-mail Drafts

For messages that are going to be encrypted when sent, the MUA MUST take care to not leak the cleartext of drafts or other partially composed messages to their e-mail provider (e.g., in the "Drafts" folder). If there is a chance that a message could be encrypted, the MUA SHOULD encrypt the draft only to itself before storing it remotely. The MUA SHOULD NOT sign drafts.

3.5.2 Cleartext replies to encrypted messages

In the common case, a reply to an encrypted message will also be encrypted. Due to Autocrypt's opportunistic approach to key discovery, however, it is possible that keys for some of the recipients may not be available, and, as such, a reply can only be sent in the clear.

To avoid leaking cleartext from the original encrypted message in this case, the MUA MAY prepare the cleartext reply without including any of the typically quoted and attributed text from the previous message. Additionally, the MUA MAY include some text in the message body describing why the usual quoted text is missing. An example of such copy can be found in *Example Copy when a Reply can't be Encrypted* (page 22).

The above recommendations are only "MAY" and not "SHOULD" or "MUST" because we want to accommodate a user-friendly Level 1 MUA that stays silent and does not impede the user's ability to reply. Opportunistic encryption means we can't guarantee encryption in every case.

3.6 Key Gossip

It is a common use case to send an encrypted mail to a group of recipients. To ensure that these recipients can encrypt messages when replying to that same group, the keys of all recipients can be included in the encrypted payload. This does not include BCC recipients, which by definition must not be revealed to other recipients.

The `Autocrypt-Gossip` header has the same format as the `Autocrypt` header (see *autocryptheaderformat* (page 6)). Its `addr` attribute indicates the recipient address this header is valid for as usual, but may relate to any recipient in the `To` or `Cc` header. See example in *Example Autocrypt Gossip headers* (page 17)

The `Autocrypt-Gossip` header MAY also be used to include keys for the address specified in the `Reply-To` header. This allows replying encrypted even if the address differs from those in the `From`, `To`, and `Cc` headers.

3.6.1 Key Gossip Injection in Outbound Messages

An Autocrypt MUA MAY include `Autocrypt-Gossip` headers in messages. These headers MUST be placed in the root MIME part of the encrypted message payload. The encrypted payload in this case contains one Autocrypt-Gossip header for each address. Each header:

- MUST include an `addr` attribute that matches one of the addresses in the `To`, `Cc`, or `Reply-To` headers.
- MUST include the `keydata` attribute. For `To` and `Cc` headers it MUST contain the same public key which is used to encrypt the mail to the recipient referenced by `addr`. See also *Preliminary Recommendation* (page 9) for how this key is selected. For the address in the `Reply-To` headers it SHOULD contain the public key which the sender expects to be used for that address.
- SHOULD NOT include a `prefer-encrypt` attribute.

[14] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3156.html

If a key has multiple user ids, only one SHOULD be contained in `keydata`. This user id SHOULD be picked to match the `addr` attribute, if possible. This is only relevant for keys which came from or were merged with data from external sources.

To avoid leaking metadata about a third party in the clear, an `Autocrypt-Gossip` header SHOULD NOT be added outside an encrypted MIME part.

3.6.2 Updating Autocrypt Peer State from Key Gossip

An incoming message may contain one or more `Autocrypt-Gossip` headers in the encrypted payload. Each of these headers may update the Autocrypt peer state of the gossiped address identified by its `addr` value (referred to here as `gossip-addr`) in the following way:

1. If `gossip-addr` does not match any address in the mail's `To`, `Cc`, or `Reply-To` header, the update process terminates (i.e., header is ignored).
2. If `peers[gossip-addr].gossip_timestamp` is more recent than the message's effective date, then the update process terminates.
3. Set `peers[gossip-addr].gossip_timestamp` to the message's effective date.
4. Set `peers[gossip-addr].gossip_key` to the value of the `keydata` attribute.

4 Managing accounts controlled by the MUA

See *Accounts controlled by the MUA* (page 4) for a definition of the structure of information stored about the MUA's own e-mail accounts.

4.1 Secret key generation and storage

The MUA SHOULD generate and store two RSA 3072-bit secret keys for the user, one for signing and self-certification, and the other for decrypting. An MUA with hardware constraints (e.g., one using an external crypto token) MAY choose to generate and store 2048-bit RSA secret keys instead. The MUA MUST be capable of assembling these keys into an OpenPGP certificate (**RFC 4880 "Transferable Public Key"**[15]) that indicates these capabilities.

4.1.1 Secret key protection at rest

The secret key material should be protected from access by other applications or co-tenants of the device at least as well as the passwords the MUA retains for the user's IMAP or SMTP accounts.

The MUA MAY protect the secret key (and other sensitive data it has access to) with a password, but it SHOULD NOT require the user to enter the password each time they send or receive a mail. Since Autocrypt-enabled MUAs *sign all encrypted outgoing messages* (page 9), it could happen that the user has to enter the password very often, both for reading and sending mail. This introduces too much friction to become part of a routine daily workflow.

Note that password protection of the secret key carries with it a risk that the user might forget their password, which might result in catastrophic data loss. Unlike IMAP or SMTP credentials (which can be reset by the server operator given some sort of out-of-band confirmation), there is no recovery workflow possible for the loss of a password protecting a secret key. An MUA that chooses to offer password protection of the secret key (or other sensitive data) SHOULD support usable and secure backup/recovery workflows for the protected material.

Protection of the user's keys (and other sensitive data) at rest is achieved more easily and securely with filesystem-based encryption and other forms of access control.

[15] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.1

4.2 Handling Multiple Accounts and Aliases

An MUA that is capable of connecting to multiple e-mail accounts SHOULD have a separate and distinct Autocrypt `accounts[from-addr]` for each e-mail account with the address `from-addr`.

A multi-account MUA MAY maintain a single `peers` table that merges information from e-mail received across all accounts for the sake of implementation simplicity. While this results in some linkability between accounts (the effect of mails sent to one account can be observed by activity on the other account), it provides a more uniform and predictable user experience. Any linkability concerns introduced by Autocrypt can be mitigated by using a different MUA for each e-mail account.

Sometimes a user may be able to send and receive e-mails with multiple distinct e-mail addresses ("aliases") via a single account. For the purposes of Autocrypt, the MUA SHOULD treat each specific alias as a distinct account.

4.3 Avoiding MUA Conflicts

If more than one Autocrypt-enabled MUA generates a key and then distributes it to communication peers, encrypted mail sent to the user is only readable by the MUA that sent the last message. This can lead to behavior that is unpredictable and confusing for the user.

See section *Helping Users get Started* (page 15) for guidance on how to detect and avoid such a situation.

4.4 Autocrypt Setup Message

To avoid "lock-in" of secret key material on a particular MUA, Autocrypt level 1 includes a way to "export" the user's keys and her *prefer-encrypt state* (page 4) for other MUAs to pick up, asynchronously and with explicitly required user interaction.

The mechanism available is a specially-formatted e-mail message called the Autocrypt Setup Message. An already-configured Autocrypt MUA can generate an Autocrypt Setup Message, and send it to itself. A not-yet-configured Autocrypt MUA (a new MUA in a multi-device case, or recovering from device failure or loss) can import the Autocrypt Setup Message and recover the ability to read existing messages.

An Autocrypt Setup Message is protected with a *Setup Code* (page 13).

4.4.1 Message Structure

The Autocrypt Setup Message itself is an e-mail message with a specific format. While the message structure is complex, it is designed to be easy to pack and unpack using common OpenPGP tools, both programmatically and manually.

- Both the To and From headers MUST be the address of the user account.
- The Autocrypt Setup Message MUST contain an `Autocrypt-Setup-Message: v1` header.
- The Autocrypt Setup Message MUST have a `multipart/mixed` structure, and it MUST have as first part a human-readable description about the purpose of the message (e.g. `text/plain` or `text/html` or `multipart/alternative`).
- The second mime part of the message MUST have Content-Type `application/autocrypt-setup`, and SHOULD have Content-Disposition of `attachment`. Its content consists of the user's ASCII-armored secret key, encrypted within an ASCII-armored OpenPGP symmetrically-encrypted message. Specifically, this means a block delimited with `-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----` and `-----END PGP MESSAGE-----`, which contains two OpenPGP packets: a **Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key**[16] followed by a **Symmetrically Encrypted Integrity Protected Data Packet**[17].

[16] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-5.3
[17] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-5.13

- There MAY be text above or below the ASCII-armored encrypted data in the second MIME part, which MUST be ignored while processing. This allows implementations to optionally add another human-readable explanation.
- The encrypted payload MUST begin with an ASCII-armored **RFC 4880 Transferable Secret Key**[18]. All trailing data after the first ASCII-armor ending delimiter MUST be stripped before processing the secret key. The ASCII-armored secret key SHOULD have an `Autocrypt-Prefer-Encrypt` header that contains the current `accounts[addr].prefer_encrypt` setting.
- The symmetric encryption algorithm used MUST be AES-128. The passphrase MUST be the Setup Code (see below), used with **OpenPGP's salted+iterated S2K algorithm**[19].

4.4.2 Setup Code

The Setup Code MUST be generated by the implementation itself using a Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG)[20], and presented directly to the user for safekeeping. It MUST NOT be included in the cleartext of the Autocrypt Setup Message, or otherwise transmitted over e-mail.

An Autocrypt Level 1 MUA MUST generate a Setup Code as UTF-8 string of 36 numeric characters, divided into nine blocks of four, separated by dashes. The dashes are part of the secret code and there are no spaces. This format holds about 119 bits of entropy. It is designed to be unambiguous, pronounceable, script-independent (Chinese, Cyrillic etc.), easily input on a mobile device and split into blocks that are easily kept in short term memory. For instance:

```
9503-1923-2307-
1980-7833-0983-
1998-7562-1111
```

An Autocrypt Setup Message that uses this structure for its Setup Code SHOULD include a `Passphrase-Format` header with value `numeric9x4` in the ASCII-armored data. This allows providing a specialized input form during decryption, with greatly improved usability.

As a further measure to improve usability, it is RECOMMENDED to reveal the first two digits of the first block in a `Passphrase-Begin` header, sacrificing about 7 bits of entropy. Those digits can be pre-filled during decryption, which reassures the user that they have the correct code before typing the full 36 digits. It also helps mitigate a possible type of phishing attack that asks the user to input their Setup Code.

The headers might look like this:

```
Passphrase-Format: numeric9x4
Passphrase-Begin: 95
```

If those digits are included in the headers, they may also be used in the descriptive text that is part of the Setup Message, to distinguish different messages.

4.4.3 Setup Message Creation

An Autocrypt MUA MUST NOT create an Autocrypt Setup Message without explicit user interaction. When the user takes this action for a specific account, the MUA:

- Generates a Setup Code.
- Optionally, displays the Setup Code to the user, prompts the user to write it down, and then hides it and asks the user to re-enter it before continuing. This minor annoyance is a recommended defense against worse annoyance: it ensures that the code was actually written down and the Autocrypt Setup Message is not rendered useless.

[18] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.2
[19] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-3.7.1.3
[20] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographically_secure_pseudorandom_number_generator

- Produces an ASCII-armored, minimized **OpenPGP Transferable Secret Key**[21] out of the key associated with that account.
- Symmetrically encrypts the OpenPGP transferable secret key using the Setup Code as the passphrase.
- Composes a new self-addressed e-mail message that contains the payload as a MIME part with the appropriate Content-Type and other headers.
- Sends the generated e-mail message to its own account.
- Suggests to the user to either back up the message or to import it from another Autocrypt-capable MUA.

A Level 1 MUA MUST be able to create an Autocrypt Setup Message, to preserve users' ability to recover from disaster, and to choose to use a different Autocrypt-capable MUA in the future.

4.4.4 Setup Message Import

An Autocrypt-capable MUA SHOULD support the ability to find and import an Autocrypt Setup Message when the user has not yet configured Autocrypt (that is, when `accounts[addr].secret_key` is unset). An MUA in this state could look for such a message in several ways, including:

- If the user decides to enable Autocrypt for an account, and indicates to the MUA that an older MUA has already enabled Autocrypt on that account, the new MUA could ask the user to generate an Autocrypt Setup Message from the old MUA, and then wait (e.g., via **IMAP IDLE**[22]) for such a message to arrive.
- The MUA could proactively scan the account's mailbox for a message that matches these characteristics, and it could alert the user if it discovers one.

When looking for an Autocrypt Setup Message, the MUA may encounter messages that look similar to what it expects, but are not well-formed. If the MUA discovers an e-mail message that has the `Autocrypt-Setup-Message` header but its value is not `v1`, the MUA SHOULD ignore this message entirely.

When looking for an Autocrypt Setup Message, if the MUA discovers a message with the `Autocrypt-Setup-Message: v1` header with `To:` and `From:` headers matching an account controlled by the MUA, but the message's metadata and structure is not as expected, the MUA SHOULD alert the user that a malformed Setup Message has been found, and it SHOULD NOT offer to import the message.

If the MUA finds a good Autocrypt Setup Message, it should offer to import it to enable Autocrypt. If the user agrees to do so:

- The MUA prompts the user for their corresponding Setup Code. If there is a `Passphrase-Format` header in the outer OpenPGP armor and its value is `numeric9x4`, then the MUA MAY present a specialized input dialog assisting the user to enter a code in the format described above. If there is no `Passphrase-Format` header, or the value is unknown, then the MUA MUST provide a plain UTF-8 string text entry.
- The MUA should try decrypting the message with the supplied Setup Code. The Code serves both for decryption as well as authenticating the message. Extra care needs to be taken with some PGP implementations that the Setup Code is actually used for decryption. For example, this is difficult to do correctly with GnuPG[23].
- If it decrypts, then the MUA SHOULD update `accounts[addr]` according to the contents of the decrypted message, as discussed in *Accounts controlled by the MUA* (page 4).

See *Example Setup Message* (page 22).

Since Level 1 only recommends looking for a Setup Message when `accounts[addr].secret_key` is unset, some Level 1 MUAs might not look for or handle Setup Messages for an already-configured account at all. If two such MUAs share an account, and both MUAs have somehow enabled Autocrypt on it independently without discovery of a Setup Message, they will have different secret keys. This situation is bad because it may lead to intermittently unreadable mail on either or both MUAs.

[21] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880.html#section-11.2
[22] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2177.html
[23] https://dev.gnupg.org/T3277

These simple implementations can both keep Autocrypt enabled and avoid new unreadable mail if the user manually synchronizes secret keys. To do this, the user must first *destroy their local secret key* (page 16) on one MUA. Afterwards, that MUA can begin looking for a Setup Message again. A more sophisticated implementation may offer a more user-friendly way to detect this situation and resolve it.

5 User Interface

Ideally, Autocrypt users see very little UI. However, some UI is inevitable if we want users to be able to interoperate with existing, non-Autocrypt users.

5.1 Message Composition

If an MUA is willing to compose encrypted mail, it SHOULD include some UI mechanism at message composition time for the user to choose between encrypted message or cleartext. This may be as simple as a single checkbox.

If the Autocrypt recommendation is `disable` for a given message, the MUA MAY choose to avoid exposing this UI during message composition at all.

If the Autocrypt recommendation is either `available` or `encrypt`, the MUA SHOULD expose this UI with the *recommended default* (page 7) during message composition to allow the user to make a different decision.

If the Autocrypt recommendation is `discourage`, then the MUA SHOULD expose the UI in an inactive state. But if the user chooses to activate it (e.g., clicking on the checkbox), then the UI should display a warning to the user and ask them to confirm the choice to encrypt.

5.2 Account Preferences

Level 1 MUAs SHOULD allow the user to disable Autocrypt completely for each account they control (that is, to set `accounts[addr].enabled` to `false`). For level 1, we expect most MUAs to have Autocrypt disabled by default. See *Disabling Autocrypt* (page 16) for more details.

5.3 Helping Users get Started

This section provides recommendations for MUA implementations to help users start Autocrypt immediately after an account (with the address `addr`) was set up.

The MUA SHOULD scan the mailbox for messages sent by the user (wherever the messages might be) that show evidence of OpenPGP or Autocrypt usage. It is likely sufficient to only scan the messages sent during the last 30 days, as it is unlikely that the user used Autocrypt or OpenPGP actively if no such message was sent in the recent past.

From the set of all found sent messages, the MUA should determine the best action to take from the following list of choices. Earlier choices are better than later ones.

1. If an Autocrypt Setup Message was found:

   Start a setup process suggesting the user to import the setup message. If multiple Autocrypt Setup Messages are found, the most recent message should be preferred.

2. If a sent message with an Autocrypt header was found:

   Provide guidance for creating an Autocrypt Setup Message on the MUA that created the message.

3. If there is evidence of actively used OpenPGP software (for example if a secret key is available, some specific software is installed, etc.) or if encrypted mails are found:

   Inform the user about Autocrypt on <https://autocrypt.org/pgp-users>.

4. If no evidence for Autocrypt was found:

   Create a key with default settings and without a password in the background. Set your `accounts[addr].prefer_encrypt` to `nopreference` and start sending Autocrypt headers.

5.4 Disabling Autocrypt

Once Autocrypt is enabled for a given account (`accounts[addr].enabled` is set to `true`), the user might choose to disable it. By default, disabling should only set `accounts[addr].enabled` to `false`, and it SHOULD NOT destroy `accounts[addr].secret_key`. This preserves the user's ability to read old encrypted e-mails, as well as being able to read encrypted e-mails that arrive after the user has disabled Autocrypt.

The act of re-enabling Autocrypt after it was disabled SHOULD leave `accounts[addr].secret_key` and `accounts[addr].public_key` intact, so that the user continues using the same key.

5.5 Destroying Secret Key Material

When disabling Autocrypt for an account, a Level 1 MUA MAY offer the user an opportunity to also destroy the secret key material for that account. Since Autocrypt clients generally do not discuss secret keys with users, a MUA offering this choice should use a phrase like "destroy access to encrypted messages", rather than referring to "keys" or "key material".

A MUA that allows the user this opportunity SHOULD clearly indicate to the user that the destruction of this secret key material will leave them unable to read any new messages that arrive encrypted. A MUA that only retains the encrypted form of archived messages SHOULD also indicate to the user that previously-received encrypted messages will become unreadable as well. Note that for some users, this is a desirable feature: "destroy all messages" is an appropriate action to take in some circumstances.

If the user selects this option, the MUA MUST clear both `accounts[addr].secret_key` and `accounts[addr].public_key`.

6 Appendix

6.1 E-mail Address Canonicalization

To keep consistent state referring to different but practically equivalent writings of an e-mail address, a MUA SHOULD canonicalize e-mail addresses when comparing them (for example for using an e-mail address as an index key).

Canonicalizing the domain part (the part after the `@`): A MUA SHOULD canonicalize the domain part using **IDNA2008 Punycode conversion to ASCII**[24].

Canonicalizing the local part (the part before the `@`): Autocrypt-capable MUAs that encounter a peer's e-mail address where the local part appears to be valid UTF-8 SHOULD canonicalize the local part by making it all lower-case using the "empty" locale (see W3C's discussion on Case folding[25] for more details).

SMTP specifications[26] say the local part is technically domain-specific, and byte-for-byte arbitrarily sensitive. In practice, nearly every e-mail domain treats the local part of the address as a case-insensitive string. That is, while it is permitted by the standards, `John@example.org` is very unlikely to deliver to a different mailbox than `john@example.org`.

An Autocrypt-capable MUA that is configured to use an account that has an e-mail address whose local part is not a valid UTF-8 string, or who cannot receive mail at the canonicalized form of their associated address SHOULD NOT enable Autocrypt on that e-mail account without an additional warning to the user.

Other canonicalization efforts are considered for later specification versions.

[24] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5891.html#section-4.4
[25] https://www.w3.org/International/wiki/Case_folding
[26] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321.html#section-2.3.11

6.2 Example Autocrypt headers

Alice sends Bob a simple, unencrypted e-mail message that lets Bob write back encrypted if Bob is using an Autocrypt-enabled MUA:

```
Delivered-To: <bob@autocrypt.example>
From: Alice <alice@autocrypt.example>
To: Bob <bob@autocrypt.example>
Subject: an Autocrypt header example using RSA 3072 key
Autocrypt: addr=alice@autocrypt.example; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata=
 mQGNBFn+zzUBDADBo2D+WUbm3lN1lXtQTxLhxVADIIMLK1dFUgu5w1KAMrW0x9x27cRNxzVrTfiv
 2FiwThUHZmJBFai8HtsMvn/svrCPeGPvkjTDMCWZaEEc5/g51Uyszjf6fUsGXsC9tUcva6pGHaTe
 8Iwpz5stKjRKI3U/mPdQpXmaurwzEdvlNWNi9Ao2rwWV+BK3J/98gBRFT8W6gv+T/YGXVrqXMoMM
 KLTFze2uyO0ExJkhI64upJzD0HUbGjElYdeSWz7lYhQ2y5cmnWPfrnOxiOCVyKrgBulksda5SIjE
 qCJCVYprX/Wvh5feRXYftWVQUMeo6moNOhTM9X+zQJPWWuWivOJpamIuUCziEycX8RtRo0yAOPwc
 /vIppoxAMusQCVn15YwVECngzXUi3EB72wXJ4411VfzPCSlgVNZV7Yqx1lW4PMRcFB2oblO25rk3
 GDlmqEVcG1Hh4FtEBkmwVjiv4duN0E33r2Yf8OsFAkKnRCRllYn8409DaJGou41hEV+LAsUAEQEA
 AbQyYTFlYmQ2OGQtOGM3Ny00NWI4LWIwMzMtOGNhYzNmN2QyMDZkQGF1dG9jcnlwdC5vcmeJAc4E
 EwEIADgWIQTmBGjORNd8P86f0HJx28Vlf95lpwUCWf7PNQIbAwULCQgHAgYVCAkKCwIEFgIDAQIe
 AQIXgAAKCRBx28Vlf95lp3C/C/9tthB5Q6oyyjERPZmRY3V8n60wd0h35uLqQfcb51UYKZ3j+61n
 ckz2iB9LrRxY9Q31WozMqza+Jze4/g/VYHLlS7Zg0M3pLKzbSEyDvZVT523BVFsCQwjkq679JGZ/
 xPzJOPab1udXFsKPEfNvzKgK+x0a4Q8b03SemL5mmGPBrnuCza/nFhevUrQbbtuUzhBnMFBsPKvz
 WUTKHEgIDLqz+8auPOQZSbF2D/1BEvtbobdgQi+YJLaj77/pURR1kp7su51IffTs0qgMMJh8jwQY
 lMQMhozy43eqT1y9QE+DH9RBAYpcRCmTcBE5Z8apnWpH/axfCDjboWwD62gN0dawc7WEQ+rdgu8W
 Tocoo4A6iyCk6Xs59mOGE0gsCdZvzKruJOYqvERzeDibDc3hXDjOE82okBjQhsOVCK3a7uyAIZnc
 z9Kovi0CkQ9d3EuG8297HSf1/PupsiFgHBsJzmZ549+ZHLXlZ5ss4aj9Hpe7bCk8oUUL+A61+nNY
 VsVDSO25AY0EWf7PNQEMANI3/DkEjghl0SgsbzqHaUAohh+GSMXUD7dQn28ZGxR/2Y5wu7O5MdkP
 MKIrsyQowSeGn18rnM1PxnRGOrX+QnVZTdk73VeMID6nM1TTfv5gmkjcb6NphGPeOTZyJIbjgQxE
 z2LUbhFLseRS/6COF5q6Tj+TJFSPbDs5kVm8LqAra2vdvdpxV69WP2FfzwHIKTzxEwnDKc3rp7yE
 I52qz8xMTCO+IkBIc9rwdj7TqJxMOTZQdfpY/ltiGwg3lCGYaHuejJzDQlU/X6OCEq/WT7/UVqNw
 ZkrsT4uG9BFGW+WOXuOpgA4v0YQ62XQAotVNXUY10XFrSb6DTr6vYjd0Lk/z7icAX5uzjlfJN3TV
 qJxS0pDWtfYD52B936+mizGR+97uyqEBVNQKww1pvKdZDruiR43O0k63TMO/4cAhXfw7q91/RMGg
 TJX2UC/BGMiePziboP+GHX87hRmAvFCRjQc0KFyxJGbNKID3Kn/RhUrePCAVWI34lSQ0Do5qLlRn
 9QARAQABiQG2BBgBCAAgFiEE5gRozkTXfD/On9BycdvFZX/eZacFAln+zzUCGwwACgkQcdvFZX/e
 ZaeaIwv/WR2LYKlPXe/1sMKfh+iSYeJjvqx15i4OaLumont+btZmpyYDU8sOaMB12oBgQ3sNYaQp
 fkTk/QNw3lbuiROPJeANQzC7Ckj3SDBFoMXyqxmnzhH0P1qvT90VOB061P1aHg7usuU4+MuvLKrg
 vaLtzK4xuiHIzpkTCvtcyNmiS5Qi2guPV32UQ6HccSIEaZO5w+z6a/V0JZ19lVwOnOatUp4DsDHo
 4KfcUKpNUKoUGgkOhLP7DmsqdlnQoKCw4PxnSsg7H5imHKF1Xo/8nh0G5Wl5kpJendiI1ZGy/yES
 jN9i1kKSqL4X+R4PkT9foAootoK3TrLbcyHuxFj5umcUuqqGfsvjhgC/ZIyvvoRf4X0Bnn1h9hpo
 6ZvBoPDM5lJxtUL64Zx5HXLd6CQXGfZfZVeM+ODqQyITGQT+p7uMDiZF42DKiTyJjJHABgiV+J16
 IM4woaGfCwAU+0Vg+JDuf7Ec8iKx5UNDI18PJTTzGVp65Gvz2Mq/CHT/peFNHNqW
Date: Tue, 07 Nov 2017 14:53:50 +0100
Message-ID: <rsa-3072@autocrypt.example>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain

This is an example e-mail with Autocrypt header and RSA 3072 key (key
id: 71DBC5657FDE65A7) as defined in Level 1.
```

6.3 Example Autocrypt Gossip headers

After having received messages with Autocrypt headers from both Bob and Carol, Alice sends an e-mail to the two of them, with Autocrypt Gossip headers.

```
Delivered-To: <bob@autocrypt.example>
From: Alice <alice@autocrypt.example>
To: Bob <bob@autocrypt.example>, Carol <carol@autocrypt.example>
Subject: an Autocrypt Gossip header example
Autocrypt: addr=alice@autocrypt.example; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata=
 mQGNBFn+zzUBDADBo2D+WUbm3lN1lXtQTxLhxVADIIMLK1dFUgu5w1KAMrW0x9x27cRNxzVrTfiv
```

(continues on next page)

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```
 2FiwThUHZmJBFai8HtsMvn/svrCPeGPvkjTDMCWZaEEc5/g51Uyszjf6fUsGXsC9tUcva6pGHaTe
 8Iwpz5stKjRKI3U/mPdQpXmaurwzEdvlNWNi9Ao2rwWV+BK3J/98gBRFT8W6gv+T/YGXVrqXMoMM
 KLTFze2uyO0ExJkhI64upJzD0HUbGjElYdeSWz7lYhQ2y5cmnWPfrnOxiOCVyKrgBulksda5SIjE
 qCJCVYprX/Wvh5feRXYftWVQUMeo6moNOhTM9X+zQJPWWuWivOJpamIuUCziEycX8RtRo0yAOPwc
 /vIppoxAMusQCVn15YwVECngzXUi3EB72wXJ4411VfzPCSlgVNZV7Yqx1lW4PMRcFB2oblO25rk3
 GDlmqEVcG1Hh4FtEBkmwVjiv4duN0E33r2Yf8OsFAkKnRCRllYn8409DaJGou41hEV+LAsUAEQEA
 AbQyYTFlYmQ2OGQtOGM3Ny00NWI4LWIwMzMtOGNhYzNmN2QyMDZkQGF1dG9jcnlwdC5vcmeJAc4E
 EwEIADgWIQTmBGjORNd8P86f0HJx28Vlf95lpwUCWf7PNQIbAwULCQgHAgYVCAkKCwIEFgIDAQIe
 AQIXgAAKCRBx28Vlf95lp3C/C/9tthB5Q6oyyjERPZmRY3V8n60wd0h35uLqQfcb51UYKZ3j+61n
 ckz2iB9LrRxY9Q31WozMqza+Jze4/g/VYHLlS7Zg0M3pLKzbSEyDvZVT523BVFsCQwjkq679JGZ/
 xPzJOPab1udXFsKPEfNvzKgK+x0a4Q8b03SemL5mmGPBrnuCza/nFhevUrQbbtuUzhBnMFBsPKvz
 WUTKHEgIDLqz+8auPOQZSbF2D/1BEvtbobdgQi+YJLaj77/pURR1kp7su51IffTs0qgMMJh8jwQY
 lMQMhozy43eqT1y9QE+DH9RBAYpcRCmTcBE5Z8apnWpH/axfCDjboWwD62gN0dawc7WEQ+rdgu8W
 Tocoo4A6iyCk6Xs59mOGE0gsCdZvzKruJOYqvERzeDibDc3hXDjOE82okBjQhsOVCK3a7uyAIZnc
 z9Kovi0CkQ9d3EuG8297HSf1/PupsiFgHBsJzmZ549+ZHLXlZ5ss4aj9Hpe7bCk8oUUL+A61+nNY
 VsVDSO25AY0EWf7PNQEMANI3/DkEjghl0SgsbzqHaUAohh+GSMXUD7dQn28ZGxR/2Y5wu7O5MdkP
 MKIrsyQowSeGn18rnM1PxnRGOrX+QnVZTdk73VeMID6nM1TTfv5gmkjcb6NphGPeOTZyJIbjgQxE
 z2LUbhFLseRS/6COF5q6Tj+TJFSPbDs5kVm8LqAra2vdvdpxV69WP2FfzwHIKTzxEwnDKc3rp7yE
 I52qz8xMTCO+IkBIc9rwdj7TqJxMOTZQdfpY/ltiGwg3lCGYaHuejJzDQlU/X6OCEq/WT7/UVqNw
 ZkrsT4uG9BFGW+WOXuOpgA4v0YQ62XQAotVNXUY10XFrSb6DTr6vYjd0Lk/z7icAX5uzjlfJN3TV
 qJxS0pDWtfYD52B936+mizGR+97uyqEBVNQKww1pvKdZDruiR43O0k63TMO/4cAhXfw7q91/RMGg
 TJX2UC/BGMiePziboP+GHX87hRmAvFCRjQc0KFyxJGbNKID3Kn/RhUrePCAVWI34lSQ0Do5qLlRn
 9QARAQABiQG2BBgBCAAgFiEE5gRozkTXfD/On9BycdvFZX/eZacFAln+zzUCGwwACgkQcdvFZX/e
 ZaeaIwv/WR2LYKlPXe/1sMKfh+iSYeJjvqx15i4OaLumont+btZmpyYDU8sOaMB12oBgQ3sNYaQp
 fkTk/QNw3lbuiROPJeANQzC7Ckj3SDBFoMXyqxmnzhH0P1qvT90VOB061P1aHg7usuU4+MuvLKrg
 vaLtzK4xuiHIzpkTCvtcyNmiS5Qi2guPV32UQ6HccSIEaZO5w+z6a/V0JZ19lVwOnOatUp4DsDHo
 4KfcUKpNUKoUGgkOhLP7DmsqdlnQoKCw4PxnSsg7H5imHKF1Xo/8nh0G5Wl5kpJendiI1ZGy/yES
 jN9i1kKSqL4X+R4PkT9foAootoK3TrLbcyHuxFj5umcUuqqGfsvjhgC/ZIyvvoRf4X0Bnn1h9hpo
 6ZvBoPDM5lJxtUL64Zx5HXLd6CQXGfZfZVeM+ODqQyITGQT+p7uMDiZF42DKiTyJjJHABgiV+J16
 IM4woaGfCwAU+0Vg+JDuf7Ec8iKx5UNDI18PJTTzGVp65Gvz2Mq/CHT/peFNHNqW
Date: Tue, 07 Nov 2017 14:56:25 +0100
Message-ID: <gossip-example@autocrypt.example>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
 protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
 boundary="PLdq3hBodDceBdiavo4rbQeh0u8JfdUHL"

--PLdq3hBodDceBdiavo4rbQeh0u8JfdUHL
Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
Content-Description: PGP/MIME version identification

Version: 1

--PLdq3hBodDceBdiavo4rbQeh0u8JfdUHL
Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="encrypted.asc"
Content-Description: OpenPGP encrypted message
Content-Disposition: inline; filename="encrypted.asc"

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

hQGMAypihPateFlyAQv+Mnd0eKclm2/+RU4Qp3zmbQ3+5mHE7p3ZLiwnN7Xk7NXC
rqTEHpAquDEYiXhs4tvmuDH7t+OG1kOPDfG66Cz1cLCwGrLI4AVC6Y5rBze1Ejo6
z3oFto3dmA4F1NTT8I8K6DYEfzmlkuamKcsVTTagkVfX084w1NL1BYJbKnYkLbyt
Nfa6xfunYkvUCD8+ymwBzuPMwhFJt2EicFTTIHklRSu2K+wC1ULx0hSluU+kMLWY
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HOWLu/cME10r6X9osQjo4XesjJVJTTF35/XraSts5EE/R7VTOmqP/Nw5Y/VO9E1g
kl2nXAnEXVyIY/lv0B1ghQGMA1T/aSXWyfnUAQv8DjK2YiuZa2Ky8NBmoxXp2ZHe
HIuSqXp8Efv0FMjCKa3tfRR9m1a1/e2DkCe/37VW/5kzBhBvUjXLDZ+tkiijw8cy
Gi9vlWinZdaAKyuaO5BU91cGd3YX2JeBvMsQqAPytzlBQPMtqdyyZQsU0hHqbpKJ
```

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```
nNcrdfS3wX5qJg2DjtRpurjHiNvfLuWMizZ1ZvovXKB/WcpbjERU3XP7Px3sFMIb
8gM8YeZoFG1GUAs8XFW1JjpNDMYX7CyG/wQGQHmNm64P6sNELN+2R6omV0xvalHx
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rF/7xP0Bu3WaMtnxO56IaXGpqvy2vRieaexmrWIT6Vy79qq+86G2OqV6oOfZX9FU
bG2YJ77s/S4GveLuHTE/F5LqP/TShBLGxdpKFHoCES0HmvbJ2iXgmB6Xw1rfbZQu
oOe3R919KoymHRdUsQ33b55cv2lrWQt/z5cv82FFhQGMA4BmeZ3vRAbVAQwArIzC
JJvNYTPxX7wz/5IsORyKaYz/IL03hBbdar6ZIcdJ9J9en2vriaxYn4Z7Yl+N+alZ
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BfSFtlDYHd3bE8oLgqKkJTAWq8zcbU0xWuuBUJdWV3aGZ/nfc11ifxmOe4HQ2tXR
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Kjqx9c0WDMkegqK54pcaU50KgQpqiGrfeMv+ALepDMwFJOPty85pK+nlHJi2gEqx
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ScrZQx1uNt7Em9WHMVInRWWwf77smEgvw027/5LLrdve943MUdVREYPJYeMCeMul
UQpHCZa2+RPq9X7LEzP2k1ge75uzCjPDAtqv11Ro3NnXtZ8CxXHWaCoHlhV3Zbi7
PmI2/VlwRj8gZewuLXShaIDUHsXypFoGig6jIaU6WPyKGFHMtKmTEFpFopPzlOyY
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```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tzwGF4RxmiCDDGlJDYoZ+4FAi0wADVuzLPXtbfSlw3jVtaMIk8A5rhwOGUO1ePiL
NcaLhiAM6JLDEV/1ykVuMvXQEVSV5vT3MovOWl/v3R9ve6+beGYyzptJ/l5oSooy
IK08XK1YyYnGDMEEnNOYfobCmw+/ctNPwdM5ioWskzUx6ku34G74O49gtRccHnYa
uU7l5VvdDfRwwsrhNyMpVK9IAcamzigskP/SXGzxDCK/jvN/3mc2X9U00JqhewdG
TgajsJr7AFwvj0yXlGsY9SvnaBosQqnvddD0dpvVVQXsLwXHCSngI/3XwFtl5c3u
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u+VKA/1SGxLvxcrdIinwlAcDRXAw7XNDMiYaOgOP6dRXF+4U1ysCS78WvvDfmMvB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=69xN
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

--PLdq3hBodDceBdiavo4rbQeh0u8JfdUHL--
```

Since Alice encrypts messages to herself, the above message can be decrypted by her private key as well (see the *Example Setup Message* (page 22) for access to her private key)

When decrypted, the encrypted part contains:

```
Autocrypt-Gossip: addr=bob@autocrypt.example; keydata=
 mQGNBFoBt74BDAC8AMsjPY17kxodbfmHah38ZQipY0yfuo97WUBs2jeiFYlQdunPANi5VMgbAX+H
 Qb8LBKKoUOmJQrONj1EXz5ILEHc/rSlbJjdmCE8cw9X+EN6PW1y9XNx1ohR1OGKjs9cVW87uPmz/
```

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```
 TkIslmfzVB6wjMIll8ax/Kb3IKr6wQXUT+JvJajWoVDOOD+7FPondqOxITXMEzinJtzqfEY6SB8q
 +bwRP9bMSyGaJl0fxbqdUxU4iVj8b1JpxuhFtvZik8i06avrOPfYmSnqANBOECSmuC3Uf2plIHJR
 Fd8o12j0lzdQQH3EAcG4dAdIuGHzxdLBQSQ8o8HvBDno9epaui42HDHKUji42mf9Bc9DK4wW6Szb
 BGdefacEmowrwn1Ruc3TyFwfNLuM6AB3k0HhOftUz/4tFKWNlDxN/w6xT30GSE2pp21lu9xN1S6X
 GXOstmDX40tgdMIfZVZqzDWfkZLVeKsE7Z/SNcKouS49FdipChdy0FuEi4ua3NBFb8ImK60AEQEA
 AbQyZjJlMDk5ZDQtYmM5Yi00MGM4LWE2NmItMWE1YmM0MjFjYjRhQGF1dG9jcnlwdC5vcmeJAc4E
 EwEKADgCGwMFCwkIBwIGFQoJCAsCBBYCAwECHgECF4AWIQRp5NnH84f8yaNXvfFHTviz1NECaAUC
 WgG34wAKCRBHTviz1NECaLEtDACaozWd0RHFsA8scsp/J63hHmJplmE9eQiei3WTaypWOTwrNXFu
 2evLWETKM2JP5mKHU2EIq55lcXxUxUxVOzFZ6/4pJ7OJh8je9sg8/9aZCGLu+0B9VmTKEtOJRitG
 y+AeosZUAKhPhLWvNwCnN3sjfBEuZ8p1febYy1ZqedA1yzr8F6FinBfAiVPXqVbEOCB9dQ2JVgjA
 U/5joG6jDenTOIReerLFc90n3riZs6AFN8LtgDMjx6GJ45WjnpawEYeUd3jqMwZ5HrPkR3CMM3Kx
 XCv8r6Si9UdXQsFonVb2ZI5narwCQpRLi0FwlvretzSOgKdtYOXDWXpgMw7npS0NqCTyYF8WG+Nq
 Gq4cwKmlSmYYhvsxIwu134CrA5HNvESUaVPHlenRtfajeAHf2KiVx5Wt4tM/RSm+Ls+3U8wKnzGt
 hNcfnmAhHZ4O+45Drmjc/RzWQMGTWLMQd4uEQ79bulcRXrdde+0sRGweBdLACIU9R8meLXUtwFRN
 jY0/OQS5AY0EWgG3vgEMALLuoUYqjHxHWA5rtGWVgN7s36ypU7KLX8gWk0cz15K0j1K6x+RAQfq0
 IkcMekC5ShdIt4B7P8+dwWPK75VsTnPk8mlm/QurSNx6KMpBDsr6qy3S6u8C8JicNgutEA3s3nAE
 fkvnMmqzp9Z+g8BI5ZUjQAahlW3Qj7g/QKFHhSrYU/7TXGn7o9VvpvKF5HqLdhmpPWI/pUrO2sK5
 48R8q8MPXa9fdbE3edYWmAwMP69wYbyC2aW2OnKyI/jfcjiMDabGTSDysCmyJ2F5NU9gluOac6qE
 CVCmC8LI2ddQp+h4A8QcVVRsvxYGg25d9Ii5dJVRupKTWWEy7Xak5xEECeEZC78y7HAsaA39M9JM
 zsLD/szyrVuo7gXzgyoZJNQ6O+b+GrRVJEikrUTddbLaPq/v3hYZaGg3ECuBOy2ISf1OeC7S6ObF
 jrSQ9WmIG6s5r2IjOaPX++9xrqh9uUAeEgO9dtDBMfEtW8X6buL9uSXM16z5z6E8L1BqGG4x56OI
 owARAQABiQG2BBgBCgAgFiEEaeTZx/OH/MmjV73xR074s9TRAmgFAloBt74CGwwACgkQR074s9TR
 Amg7YAv/cv5Yt3Ja/flXuFhk+TU6WMvz0ehbMIIegW42aW69k78vtEnhwZEYfvE0Vn8YO2/s+n8q
 cimkJFm0TNYnmybO6lbCtJG03UsJ84H0zB2L5ws8hTfTHy3xqBqaz7hBxki9oK1rIcSeSPfbGa48
 O8w1+FQswFht0L4BTCd/4OfdwLVWFPVgjk/UZn9vMKxMgtN9+VJ72hwKU/Rf3PnWI6DIKM6MA50a
 YUHxZjYR2KBmq6LJ91rdJ+WUBV7EB2HwtCsx/6kA5gy4ZLQLhrhQz9fS5sjCwFH4mg0i3qTRGxWx
 UwKVvwExHYbqvcEQvWw/l3PO6eNJd2qG1Y6uAI0K8Un3UmFeVRQBNmFyX52GqJvMtPdXcawrj081
 Mq1XoBRs6qW+WpX8Uj11mu22c57BTUXJRbRr4TnTuuOQmT0egwFDe3x8vHSFmcf9OzG8iKR9ftUE
 +F2ewrzzmm3XY8hy7QeUgBfClZVA6A3rsX4gGawjDo6ZRBbYwckINgGX/vQk6rGs
Autocrypt-Gossip: addr=carol@autocrypt.example; keydata=
 mQGNBFoBt8oBDADGqfZ6PqW05hUEO1dkKm+ixJXnbVriPz2tRkAqT7lTF4KBGitxo4IPv9RPIjJR
 UMUo89ddyqQfiwKxdFCMDqFDnVRWlDaM+r8sauNJoIFwtTFuvUpkFeCI5gYvneEIIbf1r3Xx1pf5
 sLzaERhrHMZMG2farrA+IBymPf/BRdcE3rkUU95ssna51/aEEA/YrCFAwcGq7yW70OmF1Km/SiCZ
 V4/m0fae9+Xw+elWMb+Mav7xL1vbqGIIPVr0bZgg8rr4qnJeK/Nx9OvFDD/TepcUfWWUTd8mFYdE
 P/2OJs5WGLjlQKUK7LNLDix7deGVhriugVGMsDn5BToj0EXlqi1khOGX2PGz/E+KOWBMnUdU7M1B
 qeCfKIIDtwCx3bkLd+eRAvF7UPQ+nZV8c/BvDJSGL7Mak3wrd9P2YxmSFditPReemtGHsSE0KdJ7
 Cbg5w4LqD9nTv2CETwFsZeP2YABqLe31d1fKEsxTJahVTmTWMkBSTaAmtTmbU2tZsr6nJJsAEQEA
 AbQyNDRkYTliODUtZDgwYS00NmQzLWJjMGUtOTM2ZWMxN2Y5YWZkQGF1dG9jcnlwdC5vcmeJAc4E
 EwEKADgCGwMFCwkIBwIGFQoJCAsCBBYCAwECHgECF4AWIQRNY57MDS/rhzDQVtfBq7jfn25RMgUC
 WgG3/wAKCRDBq7jfn25RMsNkDACs+o9B41TQlTfx+vChiw2KNdlVGCFFSp2TwuiUjkqpLXHwk34N
 pFAbiAUgNNg80Wh9Jkv7b0KX1+eapmkMbNpHWN7u2bMxjerKvp1uuuZNSYGB6YYDDQJrhUariEFm
 eYNMV0r3NGKihfM41+E9rvbrUs4AIWdGn5Wx9mM78XzGy2WSxuI0fRN+zJ5dYphVI+VM8IR5Ah8f
 b/g7c9Vttc1h3ICEuOkxJBcvSGafSc+KVj8SrsAjnh1vRD/RBwQmWN7Lay0+9GIWG7U1xLm5LjWb
 0vZ+9giGbZuzuKUtvAu05j6pxdVdNn2yXYKvM6RNTFrnzRZ0JSuB7JmcS8xUvJhl1Xk+lLa+x1eS
 r5URQJ7weoqSffKyCojFMd+l3tfv3lfhCk+9VYqnxAq817ooTeRYH1rXn6vI5qxWjYqpF4Av+yiy
 77lj8ES7wRfTSmvHblZHYehr20kQr2ibRiv28XdOvxh5UDU4joNvV7btK+uQM0fqgdpPQd6RQQ97
 BjJxI/W5AY0EWgG3ygEMAL2AepcoX8fAdRuyajftxM+9PBiARIu5Nvf8rVbI87+qvENEXoDWfT2I
 /iGskpY+5KtnYnDfqo8ut/DgHg53Ea6gtdr1z6+FibmmoTXm81tXnTIMf2WhHMq/P343bHRWYqh4
 V3qes1cAzugp8DF8sE4Jte1rCksRjzAWjlBD2X3g2WWSx2wZT4LsIAuDXW0xXSrlVzg8hSK4Xq+4
 6KxaRzG0H+N91X8mjlQMTV16aX5WVI6Rk8WDxpAmBny1CbKlUu/sRhN40Td3NMQj7bkpcnXeeceO
 /JVbgLEvARG5mj14BWJMSdgXoI12o6/v7xPh+b3cpc7+W6zApvwyhDLaizHjDeS1SqT/BeeIQqiw
 4G75zwBkD3jLRPr/meO/z6J99hQVZYCnIQtZfxw4dZ6teJ1W7rfkn9BiX1dG94xi2poWR0T4TPjP
 TAFTDSzWdLsPJvklb0/+nhHuGeYzTVEW7Y0yIZZXE5rVmTcuCpFPv+M6VrFfnlCdb5iSJZ341Ol9
 owARAQABiQG2BBgBCgAgFiEETWOezA0v64cw0FbXwau4359uUTIFAloBt8oCGwwACgkQwau4359u
 UTKySwv/caLupPaC7kudaEEWlwlY1KbrKAwPeS0RYIYaPGnrgDFj8e9ThaxMaogD8JRdJ35kZedm
 wInRKvwSCE9NydkJNGBbUkXqInnnuqgq0nFELdwJkfk8+sOhnXDoCrUkAoS6IbUqQ9ua9gFF5kmj
 +jKhwMnRR90k5refGrpp9C6lDTxGSOkNqt2Ca7/O6oBovckRNQln75xR04ikvBF9o3VZcfSyDxR+
 eNEb2fMmp66vda8KYncvhBMC3Gi+ablNCfbMP9Lax+pzAB2xb1USBxQcJzDQBmhYLBESAx6IEDne
 c6d9sMH9Y3GPq4aS4M9gFVCCVv+nUGzkYYEordIot2dKTPRQi2Cz//XXrVNglpXhdtDUgh0mKBuM
 6dYFLBDqcDrPcQabyGUJZyHknkQJkto0aSNmHqasjuVhS2N7UuHI+ILMUlSQpBQaCirTTz+CpwKU
 Iy9qsd5eg/4Vvc2AezUv+A6p2DUNHgFMX2FfDus+EPO0wgeWbNaV601aE7UhyugB
```

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```
Content-Type: text/plain

Hi Bob and Carol,

I wanted to introduce the two of you to each other.

I hope you are both doing well!  You can now both "reply all" here,
and the thread will remain encrypted.

Regards,
Alice
```

6.4 Example Copy when a Reply can't be Encrypted

```
The message this is a reply to was sent encrypted, but this reply is
unencrypted because I don't yet know how to encrypt to
``bob@example.com``.  If ``bob@example.com`` would reply here, my
future messages in this thread will be encrypted.
```

6.5 Example User Interaction for Setup Message Creation

The Setup Code shown in this example can be used with *Example Setup Message* (page 22) below.

```
You'll need to use this Setup Code in your other e-mail app to use
the Autocrypt Setup Message:

    1742-0185-6197-
    1303-7016-8412-
    3581-4441-0597
```

6.6 Example User Interaction for Setup Message Receipt

To initiate the import of the Autocrypt Setup Message, the MUA can display a message like the example below:

```
ExampleMail has detected an Autocrypt Setup Message created by one
of the other apps you use to access "alice@autocrypt.example".  By
importing the settings from this message, you can start using
Autocrypt here in ExampleMail too!

Please enter the Setup Code displayed by your other e-mail app to
proceed:

                17__ - ____ - ____ -
                ____ - ____ - ____ -
                ____ - ____ - ____


           [   Cancel   ]     [ Import Settings ]
```

6.7 Example Setup Message

Alice's MUA sends her a Setup Message after showing her a Setup Code (the code used here is the one from *Example User Interaction for Setup Message Creation* (page 22)). The generated message looks like this:

```
Date: Sun, 05 Nov 2017 08:44:38 GMT
To: alice@autocrypt.example
From: alice@autocrypt.example
Autocrypt-Setup-Message: v1
Subject: Autocrypt Setup Message
Content-type: multipart/mixed; boundary="Y6fyGi9SoGeH8WwRaEdC6bbBcYOedDzrQ"

--Y6fyGi9SoGeH8WwRaEdC6bbBcYOedDzrQ
Content-Type: text/plain

This message contains all information to transfer your Autocrypt
settings along with your secret key securely from your original
device.

To set up your new device for Autocrypt, please follow the
instuctions that should be presented by your new device.

You can keep this message and use it as a backup for your secret
key. If you want to do this, you should write down the Setup Code
and store it securely.
--Y6fyGi9SoGeH8WwRaEdC6bbBcYOedDzrQ
Content-Type: application/autocrypt-setup
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="autocrypt-setup-message.html"

<html><body>
<p>
This is the Autocrypt setup file used to transfer settings and
keys between clients. You can decrypt it using the Setup Code
presented on your old device, and then import the contained key
into your keyring.
</p>

<pre>
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Passphrase-Format: numeric9x4
Passphrase-Begin: 17
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F++fMh0bH1/aewmlg5wd0ixwZoP1o79he8Q4kfATZAjvB1xSLyMma+jxW5uu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GUxB8WuvNeHAtQ7qXF7TkaZvUpF0rb1aV88uABOOPpsfAyWJo/PExCZacg8R
```

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```
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rfFj8wNSX1aK/pIwWmh1EkygPSxomWRUANLX1jO6zX9wk2X80Xn9q/8jot1k
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```

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```
zthZCLIlnF+lS6e41WJv3n1dc4dFWD7F5tmt/7uwLC6oUGYsccSzY+bUkYhL
dp7tlQRd5AG/Xz8XilORk8cUjvi6uZss5LyQpKvGSU+77C8ZV/oS62BdS5TE
osBTrO2/9FGzQtHT+8DJSTPPgR6rcQUWLPemiG09ACKfRQ/g3b9Qj0upOcKL
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9eHgFo25HbitcKJ1sAqxsnYIW5/jIVyIJC7tatxmNfFQQ/LUb2cT+Jowwsf4
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rC7di4UhabWQCQTG1GYZyrj4bm6dg/32uVxMoLS5kuSpi3nMz5JmQahLqRxh
argg13K2/MJ7w2AI23gCvO5bEmD1ZXIi1aGYdZfu7+KqrTumYxj0KgIesgU0
6ekmPh4Zu5lIyKopa89nfQVj3uKbwr9LLHegfzeMhvI5WQWghKcNcXEvJwSA
vEik5aXm2qSKXT+ijXBy5MuNeICoGaQ5WA0OJ30Oh5dN0XpLtFUWHZKThJvR
mngm1QCMMw2v/j8=
=9sJE
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
</pre></body></html>
--Y6fyGi9SoGeH8WwRaEdC6bbBcYOedDzrQ--
```

When decrypted with the Setup Code, the encrypted blob at the end contains:

```
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
Autocrypt-Prefer-Encrypt: mutual
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```

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```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28TPUrWZ2wofqw9d9oIwMxf0SoP1hl0H75iLiOI3zEZWf47OHw1Qbhkuzpvuosa2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6uib2SF3aMzes/a+CdQR6GC+cGNAEz3YRb6d4dsEmP3xQrEsRQYA/Uw95K8jjIYs
GSngKdpfAE8rEbn6Au92OKONEE1OvdFFuLg+m8R2TYXr9U8j5bA96lvKvSe/nAUj
jn7Vjnk3OFoO5htW0agkGIAKUDFS6ZljGdJWrD67IM+GHLHoVkIsDCY0JLS76HO7
JC/P08j+2K6IwSYqx8TUTywMPGtIRDEllgJwPTXKnV9H7WTbqqjNgWR3dalKKLY1
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2Ez6LFePDA8joX9m75yXh1ClfPJpMhu4+gaaNPU7+S8gU52BvD6AFqzJQSvwZmB9
uzqiKQooqez1Js9zP/6+sPk91SmZzdvLjQ4/JwaiCPtw9/tGW8/nFQxNeg0jdOJV
IFPmop0+ouvyTINkfN69AgU3BuBGo+kTXRbjV7Q7JNdFFjSKBK56ptFJvR/h4mpE
0Lxvl0gKnmDxWYyE0Byquak0hd75O2O9ttRWeatE1b1o4bV0+A1Osi7lxIkBtgQY
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TRzalg==
=f96/
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-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
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6.8 Document History

This document is kept under revision control[27]. For detailed history, please consult the git logs. This section provides a high-level overview of what changed between revisions.

version 1.0.1

- added Terminology section
- added Document History section
- specify how to deal with using non-Autocrypt keys (stripping excess user IDs)
- minor language, markup, and orthography cleanup

version 1.0.0

- first complete specification

[27] https://github.com/autocrypt/autocrypt